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Cyberspace1 is the new frontier—the 21st century Brave New 
World.2 While the Internet3 opens up a universe of new possibilities, who 
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is the sheriff in this frontier town and what law should he apply? In  
crafting the boundaries of the virtual world, historical legal precedent can 
be both instructive and informative. Arguably one of the most famous 
civil procedure cases to date is Pennoyer v. Neff.4 In this 1877 case, the 
United States Supreme Court established that an individual is not bound 
by the judgment of a specific court until and unless that court has  
properly acquired authority over that individual.5 One important and  
instructive principle underlying this decision is that a court’s power and 
authority over an individual is limited by territorial boundaries.6 In  
reaching its decision, the Court emphasized a federal constitutional limit 
on the power a state court could wield, limiting it to a rigid system of 
authority over only those persons or property located within a state’s 
borders.7 In its approach to the territorial power of state courts, Pennoyer 
assumed that each state was essentially a separate entity and that  
interstate activity was the exception.8 Indeed, the Supreme Court initially 
relied upon traditional notions of sovereignty adopted from international 
law wherein states were treated like countries, each with exclusive  
sovereignty over its own persons or property.9 
Although Pennoyer prevailed for seventy years as the overarching 
philosophy of the territorial limits of proper exercise of judicial power, 
its rigidity and lack of foresight left many courts without guidance when 
attempting to apply the traditional notion of jurisdiction to interstate 
commerce. This became glaringly apparent with the railway boom during 
                                                                                                                       
 1. See generally William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real World  
Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 197 (1995). The term “cyberspace” 
is sometimes treated as a synonym for the Internet and sometimes treated as a completely different, 
and much broader, concept that emphasizes its treatment as a place. For purposes of this Note, I will 
use the two interchangeably and to mean a notional environment in which communication and data 
transfer over computer networks occurs. 
 2. See generally ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1932) (anticipating developments in 
reproductive technology, psychological manipulation, sleep-learning, and classical conditioning that 
drastically change in response to a profoundly different society in the 26th century characterized as a 
densely imagined dystopian state). 
 3. See generally Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996)  
(illustrating one of the first instances in which a United States District Court attempted to describe 
the basic infrastructure of the Internet). While the foundational structure of the Internet remains, the 
Internet has evolved over the past two decades with changes including: reduction in expense to use, 
reduction in technical challenge to log on, increase in amount of information and services provided, 
etc. Id.  
 4. See generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
 5. Id. at 721–35. 
 6. HOWARD M. ERICHSON, INSIDE CIVIL PROCEDURE: WHAT MATTERS AND WHY 33 (2d ed. 
2012). 
 7. Id. at 35. 
 8. Id. 
 9. JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, STEVEN BAICKER-MCKEE, BROOKE D. COLEMAN, DAVID F. HERR & 
MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, LEARNING CIVIL PROCEDURE 76 (2013). 
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the last third of the nineteenth century, the birth of the automobile, and 
the construction of interstate highways.10 It has become ever more  
complicated with the invention of the airplane and the expansion of the 
Internet.11 Just as the industrialization and mobilization of our nation  
reduced the significance of state and national boundaries, those same 
boundaries have become all but invisible with the rise of the Internet.12 
Commentators agree that the “explosive growth of [the Internet] has 
raised concerns about applying existing substantive and procedural  
doctrine, both largely defined by geography, to a world without physical 
borders.”13 
Certainly, the post-Pennoyer era itself saw an expansion in case law 
and a partial overruling14 of Pennoyer—rejecting the schema of  
Pennoyer—with the decision of International Shoe v. Washington in 
1945.15 In International Shoe, the United States Supreme Court shifted 
from an analysis of whether the defendant was present in the forum 
state’s geographical boundaries to an examination of the defendant’s 
contacts with the forum state.16 In Pennoyer, the Court stressed the  
importance of sovereignty and territorial boundaries.17 By 1945,  
however, the Court understood the need for a more abstract way of  
determining whether exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 
defendant was proper.18 International Shoe’s “minimum contacts”  
requirement allows states to exercise jurisdiction over individuals who 
purposefully avail themselves of the benefits of the forum state, whether 
or not that includes being physically present within the state’s territorial 
boundaries.19 
In 1980, the Court had an opportunity, in World-Wide Volkswagen 
Corp. v. Woodson,20 to examine the application of purposeful availment 
to the ever-increasing modern mobilization of society, specifically the 
automotive industry.21 In World-Wide Volkswagen, plaintiffs brought a 
product liability suit in an Oklahoma state court against nonresident  
                                                     
 10. ERICHSON, supra note 6, at 45. 
 11. Internet Used by 3.2 Billion People in 2015, BBC (May 26, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-32884867 [https://perma.cc/72R5-NJTA]. 
 12. ERICHSON, supra note 6, at 45. 
 13. Howard B. Stravitz, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Something More is Required on 
the Electronic Stream of Commerce, 49 S.C. L. REV. 925, 926 (1998). 
 14. ERICHSON, supra note 6, at 36. 
 15. See generally Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 16. Id. at 316–17. 
 17. ERICHSON, supra note 6, at 36. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See generally World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444. U.S. 286 (1980). 
 21. ERICHSON, supra note 6, at 41. 
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defendants for burns caused by a car fire in Oklahoma, from an  
automobile purchased in New York.22 In a narrowly divided 5–4 decision 
in favor of the defendants, the majority “made it clear that state lines still 
matter, and a court’s power over an out-of-state defendant depends on 
whether the defendant acted purposefully toward the forum state.”23 In a 
vigorous dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the defendants knowingly 
sold an inherently mobile product and that it is not unreasonable to hold 
defendants answerable in a foreign state over a product that foreseeably 
could have ended up and caused harm in that foreign state.24 Further,  
Justice Brennan emphasized that personal jurisdiction “need not be so 
restrictive in an era in which modern transportation and communication 
reduce the inconvenience of litigating in another state.”25 
While the nature of jurisdiction makes the implementation of a 
bright-line test impractical, the dawning of the Internet age has posed 
further dilemmas for the Court. These dilemmas and the inability to 
reach a practicable, coherent solution have created a desperate need for  
guidance from the Supreme Court or the Legislature to create, at the very 
least, a federal standard or a single, clear test for determining proper  
Internet jurisdiction.26 As it stands now, “[r]ecent cases interpreting the 
jurisdictional effect of conducting business on the Internet have reached 
opposite conclusions based on nearly indistinguishable facts.”27 Courts 
have grappled with analyzing the extent to which a defendant’s Internet 
presence constitutes minimum contacts with a forum state.28 Although 
case law involving Internet jurisdiction is still sparse, “it is clear that the 
federal circuits are employing different standards to determine personal 
jurisdiction issues derived from Internet contacts.”29 
                                                     
 22. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288–91. 
 23. ERICHSON, supra note 6, at 41. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See generally INTERNET CRIME COMPLAINT CTR., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 2014 
INTERNET CRIME REPORT 4–48 (2014). According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Internet 
Crime Complaint Center, there were 269,422 complaints of Internet crime in the United States filed 
in 2014—a 2.5% increase in cybercrime from 2013. See id. at 4. As of May 10, 2014, the Internet 
Crime Complaint Center received its three millionth complaint since its inception in 2000. Id. The  
complaints range from a wide variety of crimes affecting victims of all nationalities, ages,  
backgrounds, educational levels and socio-economic levels. Id. at 5. These statistics further illustrate 
the glaring prevalence of cybercrime in the United States, and the desperate need for a single test for 
how examine cases in controversy that arise in cyberspace. 
 27. Todd D. Leitstein, A Solution for Personal Jurisdiction on the Internet, 59 LA. L. REV. 565, 
565 (1999). 
 28. STEMPEL, supra note 9, at 117. 
 29. Richard P. Rollo, The Morass of Internet Personal Jurisdiction: It is Time for a Paradigm 
Shift, 51 FLA. L. REV. 667, 668 (1999). 
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While various courts and numerous legal professionals have  
addressed the issue of inconsistent application of personal jurisdiction in 
cyberspace cases, the Supreme Court has yet to discuss the impact that 
technology might have on the analysis of personal jurisdiction; thus, 
many details remain unresolved.30 This Note examines the varying  
jurisdictional splits between the lower district courts, the courts of  
appeals, and the federal circuit court of appeals in determining the proper 
approach to take when dealing with Internet jurisdiction. After an  
examination of several key cases, this Note will explain why the  
Supreme Court, or the Legislature, should adopt an expanded version of 
the Ninth Circuit’s test in Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.,31 but with 
one categorical limitation, in order to standardize the test for a state’s 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident Internet sites. This  
solution merges two lines of thought and amounts to the creation of a 
single standardized and clear objective rule that requires “something 
more”—interactivity and commercialization—for non-tortious cases and 
the inclusion of an additional limiting factor for tortious cases in  
controversy. This solution fully comprehends the needs of the injured 
party to be made whole and couples it with the need for “something 
more” in order to satisfy a finding of proper personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant in cyberspace. 
Part I of this Note summarizes the traditional notions of general and 
specific personal jurisdiction and their applications to the physical and 
tangible. Part II discusses case law from several different United States 
district and appellate courts, analyzing the key facts on which each  
holding turns regarding the application of traditional jurisdiction. Part III  
examines the Ninth Circuit’s attempt to further clarify proper cyberspace 
jurisdiction in Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc. Part IV describes a  
representative sample of the different approaches and solutions legal 
scholars have posited to potentially solve the issue of how to properly 
determine cyberspace jurisdiction. Part V sets forth a workable, useful 
solution. Finally, the conclusion projects how the new approach will  
effectively adapt to future advances in technology and the positive,  
                                                     
 30. Jay C. Carle & Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Civil Liberty on the Internet, AM. B. ASS’N (Jan. 
2006), http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/gp_solo_magazine_home/gp_solo_ 
magazine_index/civilliability.html [https://perma.cc/Z3DK-4WF2] (noting that the “harm caused by 
Internet-related frauds, defective software, and the failure to adequately secure online data is increas-
ing commensurate with our dependence on computers and the Internet” and that the “common law 
must expand to perform its traditional function of allocating the burdens associated with risks of 
harm so as to maximize social welfare, which includes both technological innovation and consumer 
peace of mind”). 
 31. See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 416 (9th Cir. 1997). 
254 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 40:249 
consistent, and stable effects a single, clear test would have on  
cyberspace and the Internet. 
I. TERRITORIAL PERSONAL JURISDICTION: FROM GENERAL  
TO SPECIFIC 
The U.S. judiciary does not have the power to adjudicate cases over 
every person in the entire world.32 A court’s authority to rule over a  
particular party—in other words, the territorial reach of a court’s power 
over a particular party—is referred to as “personal jurisdiction.”33 The 
law of personal jurisdiction, as it exists today, makes sense only if it is 
viewed as a progression, with Pennoyer v. Neff as the starting point.34 As 
described above, Pennoyer focused on territorial boundaries.35 After the 
turn of the century and the mobilization of the nation in the 1890s, the 
Court again addressed personal jurisdiction, redefining the conventional 
test from an examination of a defendant’s physical presence in a state to 
an evaluation of whether the defendant had the “minimum contacts” with 
the state for jurisdiction to be fair and reasonable.36 In International 
Shoe, the Court set forth its new interpretation that “due process requires 
only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he 
be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum 
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”37 This standard 
may be sufficiently met “by such contacts of the corporation with the 
state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal  
system of government, to require the corporation to defend that particular 
suit which is brought there,”38 which includes “an ‘estimate of the  
inconveniences’ the defendant would face in litigating away from 
home.”39 
The Court determined that a state’s exercise of jurisdiction could be 
proper over a defendant in two ways: general and specific.40 General  
jurisdiction exists when a defendant’s contacts with a forum are so strong 
that a state’s courts could properly exercise authority over that defendant 
for any and all claims, without regard for where the claims arose.41 For 
                                                     
 32. STEMPEL, supra note 9. 
 33. ERICHSON, supra note 6, at 31. 
 34. Id. at 32. 
 35. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 725 (1877). 
 36. See ERICHSON, supra note 6, at 36. 
 37. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 38. ERICHSON, supra note 6, at 36. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 37–39. 
 41. Id. at 37. 
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an individual defendant, general personal jurisdiction is based on his or 
her domicile.42 If the defendant is a corporation, general personal  
jurisdiction is based on some similar, strong presence within the forum.43 
This standard ensures that every defendant is subject to the  
general jurisdiction of a court in at least one forum.44 
Regardless of whether or not a court can properly exercise general 
personal jurisdiction over a defendant for all purposes, a court may be 
able to properly exercise specific personal jurisdiction for a discrete  
matter. Specific jurisdiction is proper for a particular lawsuit if the suit’s 
claim arises out of the defendant’s contact with the forum state; this is 
known as the minimum contacts test.45 Long-arm statutes—specific state 
laws—are one such tool used to “empower courts to assert personal  
jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants,” allowing each court to extend 
its reach beyond state lines.46 Long-arm statutes can be narrow,  
enumerating the specific instances in which a state court can extend its 
jurisdictional powers, or they can be broad, allowing the proper exercise 
of jurisdiction by a state’s courts over a nonresident, so long as the  
exercise does not offend the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.47 
In determining whether it can establish personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant under a long-arm statute, a court generally  
employs the minimum contacts test, which may be applied using several 
methods: purposeful availment, the effects test, business relationships, 
stream of commerce, and reasonableness.48 The Supreme Court held in 
Hanson v. Denckla that personal jurisdiction requires “some act by 
which the defendant purposefully avails itself to the privilege of  
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits 
and protections of its laws.”49 Sometimes, however, the court determines 
whether jurisdiction is proper by examining whether or not the  
defendant’s out-of-state conduct causes effects in the forum state.50  
Calder v. Jones reinforced the notion that a court has proper personal 
jurisdiction over a nonresident so long as there are sufficient minimum 
contacts.51 
                                                     
 42. Id. at 38. 
 43. Id. 
 44. ERICHSON, supra note 6, at 39. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 40. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 39–45. 
 49. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
 50. ERICHSON, supra note 6, at 42. 
 51. See generally Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
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Other times, a court looks to the business relationships between the 
parties to determine if jurisdiction is proper. In Burger King Corp. v.  
Rudzewicz, the Supreme Court noted that, even without any physical 
presence in the forum state, there can still be grounds for a proper  
exercise of jurisdiction if there are sufficient business relations between 
the parties in the forum state.52 In that case, the defendant was  
headquartered in the forum and the parties contracted for the laws of the 
forum to govern their contract.53 
If the defendant is a manufacturer that never made contact with the 
forum, the court can look to see whether or not the defendant placed 
products into the stream of commerce—which may ultimately have  
affected the interests of the forum state—to determine jurisdiction. Asahi 
Metal Industry Company v. Superior Court of California is the Supreme 
Court’s leading stream of commerce case, which, without a majority, 
articulated three different standards for establishing the minimum  
contacts requirement within the stream of commerce.54 Garnering four 
votes, Justice O’Connor’s plurality concluded that “[t]he placement of a  
product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the 
defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.”55 Her opinion 
recognized the need for “[a]dditional conduct of the defendant,” such as 
advertising or marketing directed toward the forum, before a finding of 
proper jurisdiction could be made.56 
Also winning four votes, however, Justice Brennan’s plurality  
articulated that placement of a product into the stream of commerce by 
the defendant with the mere awareness of the product’s distribution into 
the forum state would be enough to satisfy the minimum contacts  
requirement and allow the forum jurisdiction.57 Justice Stevens, writing 
separately and joining neither plurality, suggested that “a regular course 
of dealing [by a nonresident defendant] that results in  
deliveries . . . annually over a period of several years” is conduct that 
should rise to a level sufficient enough to meet the purposeful  
availment, and thus the minimum contacts, requirement.58 Although only 
a plurality, Justice O’Connor’s views of the stream of commerce have 
“prevailed for jurisdictional disputes on the electronic stream of  
commerce.”59 
                                                     
 52. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–77 (1985). 
 53. Id. at 462. 
 54. See generally Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 55. Id. at 112. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 58. Id. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 59. Stravitz, supra note 13, at 932. 
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The final portion of the traditional constitutional examination of 
whether a forum’s exercise over a nonresident defendant is proper is an 
inquiry into whether that jurisdiction is reasonable. The reasonableness 
inquiry requires the court ask several questions: (1) how burdensome 
would it be on the defendant to litigate the dispute in the forum; (2) how 
strong is the forum’s interest in hearing the case (for example, if the  
forum is the plaintiff’s home state); and (3) how strong is the plaintiff’s 
interest in litigating in the forum (which may be persuasive if the dispute 
arises there and implicates forum laws and policies).60 Notably, while the 
reasonableness inquiry may be instructive, it is not always dispositive. In 
Asahi, the Court determined it would be unreasonable to make the  
nonresident defendant cross international waters to litigate the case—the 
“reasonableness” standard was determinative.61 In contrast, the Court 
determined in Burger King that while there existed a significant burden 
for the defendant to litigate in Florida, the forum state and the plaintiff 
had a stronger interest that outweighed the defendant’s burden.62 
Although the Court has a long history of grappling with personal 
jurisdiction as it applied to a modernizing society and what minimum 
contacts were sufficient, “[w]ith the explosion of computers in the 80’s, 
the question soon became what Internet contacts are sufficient to support 
personal jurisdiction.”63 
II. JUDICIAL ATTEMPTS AT APPLYING TRADITIONAL PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION TO CYBERSPACE 
Although the Internet is no longer a new phenomenon, and the  
concept of claims arising out of conduct performed in cyberspace is no 
longer novel, there remains no consistent standard for how to apply  
traditional notions of personal jurisdiction to cyberspace cases.64 While 
the United States Supreme Court has not discussed the impact that  
technology may have on the application of jurisdiction to matters arising 
from cyberspace, lower courts have explored this issue.65 Even so, the 
cases66 that have been decided are all but consistent and showcase the 
“courts’ struggle to conceptualize the nature of Internet contacts.”67 
                                                     
 60. ERICHSON, supra note 6, at 47. 
 61. Asahi Metal Indus. Corp., 480 U.S. at 114. 
 62. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985). 
 63. Rollo, supra note 29, at 678. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Betsy Rosenblatt, Principles of Jurisdiction, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR. FOR INTERNET & 
SOC’Y HARV. U., http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/property99/domain/Betsy.html [https://perma.cc/ 
F7ZA-C8EA]. 
 66. See generally ERIC GOLDMAN, INTERNET LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 39, 39–52 (2014). 
Professor Eric Goldman is a Professor of Law and Co-Director of the High Tech Law Institute at 
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In translating the basic concepts of personal jurisdiction to the  
Internet, courts have split on whether merely putting something on the 
Internet—like launching a passive website or using a trademark on a 
website—is enough to establish jurisdiction wherever the website is  
received and consumed or whether “something more” is necessary. The 
cases that seem to be most in line with traditional notions of “minimum 
contacts” are those that rely on “something more” than merely the reach 
of a passive website into a particular jurisdiction. 
In CompuServe v. Patterson, the “something more” was that the  
defendant knowingly entered into a contract with CompuServe (knowing 
that CompuServe was an Ohio corporation) and knowingly used  
CompuServe to fill software orders from its servers in Ohio.68 
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that Patterson “knowingly made an  
effort—and, in fact, purposefully contracted—to market a product in 
other states, with Ohio-based CompuServe operating, in effect, as his 
distribution center. Thus, it is reasonable to subject Patterson to suit in 
Ohio, the state which is home to the computer network he chose to  
employ.”69 The court applied the traditional notion of the state long-arm 
statute to examine if the Ohio court had proper personal jurisdiction, and 
its holding turned on the fact that Patterson had entered into a contract 
with, and continually sent his shareware software to, an Ohio company.70 
Further, Patterson also repeatedly advertised to Ohio citizens through 
CompuServe’s network.71 The Sixth Circuit articulated that contracting 
with, repeated distribution of products to, and targeted advertisement of a 
Company and a people of a foreign state are sufficient contacts to allow 
that state to exercise proper personal jurisdiction over a nonresident.72 
In Zippo Manufacturing v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., the “something 
more” was that the defendant’s website required participants to submit 
personal address information in order to receive a data service and, 
                                                                                                                       
Santa Clara University School of Law. His research and teaching focuses on Internet law,  
intellectual property, and marketing law. He blogs on Internet matters at the Technology &  
Marketing Blog, as well as the Tertium Quid Blog at Forbes. Professor Goldman has also taught on 
topics related to Internet law at Marquette School of Law, University of California, Berkeley School 
of Law, and the University of San Francisco School of Law. In the jurisdiction chapter of his book, 
Professor Goldman examines several other unsuccessful attempts by the court to apply traditional 
personal jurisdiction to cyberspace. 
 67. Rollo, supra note 29, at 679. 
 68. See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 1265. 
 71. Id. at 1264. 
 72. See generally id. 
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thereby, the website operators targeted and knowingly transacted  
business with residents of each participant’s state.73 
Similar to the CompuServe court, the Zippo court adopted the  
traditional application of a long-arm statute to claims arising through 
cyberspace to determine if exercise of personal jurisdiction was proper.74 
The district court had to determine (1) whether or not Zippo Dot Com 
had sufficient “minimum contacts” to the forum; (2) if the claim asserted 
against the defendant arose from those contacts; and (3) whether or not 
exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable.75 It noted that its threshold 
for determining minimum contacts was whether or not the defendant 
purposefully availed itself of the forum; in other words, whether the  
defendant purposefully established contacts with the forum.76 
In determining whether or not Zippo Dot Com met the threshold for 
each of the three prongs, the court reasoned that Zippo Dot Com had: (1) 
not just posted information on a Website that is accessible to  
Pennsylvania residents who are connected to the Internet; (2) done more 
than create an interactive website through which it exchanges  
information with Pennsylvania residents in hopes of using that  
information for commercial gain later; (3) contracted with approximately 
3,000 individuals and seven Internet access providers in Pennsylvania; 
and (4) consciously chose to conduct business in Pennsylvania, pursuing 
profits from the actions that are now in question.77 
In Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, the “something more” 
was that the defendant intentionally targeted the plaintiff as part of a 
“scam” to make the plaintiff purchase a domain name from him; thereby, 
directing its actions toward the plaintiff’s home state.78 The district court 
found that “under the ‘effects doctrine,’ Toeppen was subject to personal 
jurisdiction in California.”79 On appeal, Toeppen argued that the “district 
court erred in exercising personal jurisdiction over him because any  
contact he had with California was insignificant, emanating solely from 
his registration of domain names on the internet, which he did in  
Illinois.”80 
Due to the lack of guidance in both federal and common law, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided to examine this question by  
                                                     
 73. See generally Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
 74. Id. at 1122. 
 75. Id. at 1122–23. 
 76. Id. at 1123. 
 77. Id. at 1125–27. 
 78. See Panavision Int’l v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320–22 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 79. Id. at 1318. 
 80. Id. 
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applying California’s long-arm statue.81 The Ninth Circuit noted that the 
defendant had to be domiciled in the forum state or the defendant’s  
activities in the forum state had to be substantial or continuous and  
systematic to find personal jurisdiction proper.82 Although the court did 
not have general personal jurisdiction over Toeppen, as Toeppen was 
neither domiciled in California nor were his activities in California  
substantial or continuous and systematic, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s holding that it had specific personal jurisdiction.83 
In determining whether the specific personal jurisdiction was  
proper, the court applied a three-part test. First, the court asked whether 
the nonresident defendant acted or consummated some transaction with 
the forum state or performed some action by which the defendant  
purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in 
the forum, thereby invoking the protections and benefits of the forum’s 
laws.84 Second, the court examined whether the claim was one that arose 
out of or resulted from the defendant’s activities as they relate to the  
forum state.85 Third, the court examined whether the exercise of specific 
personal jurisdiction would be reasonable.86 
The court found that (1) the purposeful availment prong was  
satisfied by “the effects felt in California, the home state of Panavision, 
from Toeppen’s alleged out-of-state scheme to register domain names 
using the trademarks of California companies . . . for the purpose of  
extorting fees from them”;87 (2) the claims asserted by Panavision arose 
out of the defendant’s forum-related activities, namely that Panavision 
would not have been injured and the suit not brought “but for” the  
defendant’s conduct directed toward Panavision in California;88 and (3) 
Toeppen failed to present a compelling case that the district court’s  
exercise of personal jurisdiction over him in California would be  
unreasonable.89 
Similar to Zippo, in Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, the “something 
more” was that the defendant’s site invited users to send and receive  
information about services it offered, and the defendant company had 
sent information to more than 100 users in the forum state.90 In its  
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affirmation, the court noted that (1) CyberGold’s website was  
operational; (2) the website provided information about CyberGold’s 
new upcoming service; (3) the website explained that the forthcoming 
service will maintain a mailing list of Internet users, presumably  
including many residents of Missouri; and (4) CyberGold will provide 
each user with a personal electronic mailbox and will forward to the user 
advertisements that match the users selected interests.91 Put another way, 
jurisdiction was properly exercised because CyberGold’s website  
“invite[d] Missourians to put their names on CyberGold’s mailing list 
and get up-to-date information about the company and its forthcoming 
internet service,” and that through the website, CyberGold actively  
solicited customers from Missouri for advertising.92 
Viewing these cases together, it seems clear that “something more,” 
although different in each case, constitutes some form of knowing or 
purposeful exchange of data between defendant and plaintiff in the forum 
state, rather than merely a one-way passive delivery of a website. While 
these cases, taken in totality, provide some clarity as to what the  
“something more” ought to be in cyberspace cases, courts remain  
fractured on how to apply traditional personal jurisdiction to the Internet; 
there is no single, useful test to guide the court on this issue. 
III. A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION: CYBERSELL, INC. V.  
CYBERSELL, INC. 
The disagreements and inconsistencies in the above cases illustrate 
some of the variations among courts as to what constitutes sufficient 
minimum contacts and what is the correct approach when dealing with 
Internet jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit attempted to remedy this  
inconsistency by articulating a clearer vision of what “something more” 
really meant—commercialization and interactivity—with its 1997 ruling 
in Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc.93 In Cybersell, the plaintiff was an 
Arizona corporation (“Cybersell AZ”) that advertised commercial  
services over the Internet under the service mark “Cybersell.”94 Cybersell 
AZ brought a trademark infringement suit against an identically-named 
Florida corporation (“Cybersell FL”) in the United States District Court 
for the District of Arizona.95 The district court dismissed the case for lack 
of personal jurisdiction, and Cybersell AZ appealed.96 
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The Ninth Circuit noted that to exercise specific jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant in a manner consistent with due process, the  
defendant must do “some act or consummate some transaction with the 
forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of 
the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking  
benefits and protections.”97 The court further noted that the “claim must 
be one which arises out of or results from defendant’s forum-related  
activities, and exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.”98 
The key facts examined by the appellate court included the  
following: (1) Cybersell FL did nothing to encourage people in Arizona 
to access its site; (2) no Arizonan except for Cybersell AZ “hit”  
Cybersell FL’s website; (3) there was no evidence that any Arizona  
resident signed up for Cybersell FL’s web construction services;  
(4) Cybersell FL entered into no contracts in Arizona, made no sales in 
Arizona, received no telephone calls from Arizona, earned no income 
from Arizona, and sent no messages over the Internet to Arizona; (5) the 
interactivity of Cybersell FL’s web page is limited to receiving the 
browser’s name and address and an indication of interest; (6) signing up 
for the service in Arizona is not an option, nor did anyone from Arizona 
do so; and (7) no money changed hands on the Internet from (or through) 
Arizona.99 The court summarized that, in short, Cybersell FL had  
consummated no transaction, nor had it performed any act by which it 
purposefully availed itself of any privilege of conducting activities in 
Arizona.100 Since it did not invoke the benefits and protections of  
Arizona law, jurisdiction in Arizona was not proper.101 
The court held that, “Cybersell FL’s contacts are insufficient to  
establish ‘purposeful availment.’ Cybersell AZ has thus failed to satisfy 
the first prong of our three-part test for specific jurisdiction.”102 The  
Cybersell opinion articulates a noticeably clearer vision of what  
“something more” really means: interactivity and commercialization. 
One commentator has suggested: 
Under the rule set forth in Cybersell [sic], a court would decide 
whether a website creates minimum contacts by examining the  
degree to which the site is commercial and interactive, and the  
degree to which the site is directed at citizens of the forum 
state. The more interactive a site is (i.e. the more exchange of  
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information is possible between the site and the user), and the more 
commercial the site’s nature, the more likely a court is to find that 
contact exists between the site owner and the distant user. Similarly, 
the more the site is directed at an audience in the forum [state] or 
designed to harm citizens of the forum state, the more likely a court 
will be to find that purposeful availment has occurred.103 
While a court should always take into account the degree of  
interactivity—that is, the information exchanged—between the website 
and its users in determining whether jurisdiction is proper, when the 
website is engaging in commerce, the court should focus more on where 
the goods or services are to be delivered. Although the Ninth Circuit’s 
attempt at clarification is admirable, it is underinclusive in that it fails to 
consider other claims of actions, such as tortious claims. 
IV. PREVIOUSLY SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF 
CYBERSPACE JURISDICTION 
Over the past decade commentators have suggested solutions to the 
question of how to properly examine and apply the traditional notions of 
personal jurisdiction to cyberspace. While the solutions are too numerous 
to examine individually, the following is an examination of a  
representative sample of the various posited solutions offered to solve 
this very real problem. 
In Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: A Theory of International Spaces, 
author Darrel C. Menthe suggests the application of the theory of  
international spaces: adding cyberspace to the list of “others” that  
currently includes Antarctica, the high seas, and outer space.104  
According to Menthe, the solution to the cyberspace jurisdiction problem 
can be solved by recognizing cyberspace as an international space and 
mandating that the nationality of the person uploading information or 
data be the primary determining factor for the exercise of jurisdiction.105 
Menthe postulates that because Antarctica, the high seas, outer space, 
and cyberspace are all characterized by their lack of territorial borders, 
the nationality of an explorer therein should be the primary principle in  
establishing where personal jurisdiction is proper.106 Menthe concludes 
that such a standard rule would “provide predictability and international 
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uniformity. It strikes a balance between anarchy and universal liability, 
and it works.”107 
Additionally, Richard P. Rollo proposes a federally regulated  
approach to cyberspace jurisdiction and suggests the federal regulation 
should be an adoption of the “cyberspace model.”108 Rollo’s cyberspace 
model approach suggests that because there is no physical presence  
associated with Internet contacts, all contacts must then exist in  
cyberspace, and, as such, to assign a physical location to a web page, 
website, or Internet interaction would be to engage in an arbitrary fiction, 
which would lead to every state having jurisdiction over every individual 
who used the Internet.109 For example, under Rollo’s interpretation, if an 
individual in California contacts a website posted and maintained in New 
York, contact occurred in neither California nor New York because all 
contacts arising from cyberspace happen in cyberspace.110 Although  
Rollo notes his solution would wreak havoc on the traditional model of 
jurisdiction111 because it would deprive all courts of jurisdiction from the 
Internet112 and claims arising therefrom, he posits that his solution of 
federal regulation is “the simplest and most complete solution”113 to the 
problem of cyberspace jurisdiction. 
Yet, other commentators, such as Professor Julia A. Gladstone, 
suggest that the proper solution to cyberspace jurisdiction is to use a 
combination of the Calder “effects test” and the Zippo “sliding scale 
test.”114 Professor Gladstone also suggests that there should be a showing 
of specific intent to inflict damage to the plaintiff in the forum state, or 
that contact to the forum state in question impacted at least a critical 
mass of actual Internet viewers in the forum jurisdiction.115 In reaching 
her solution, Professor Gladstone asserts that her combination of tests 
would allow courts to shift away from territorial physical jurisdiction to a 
modern, standardized rule based on the subject matter and the cause of 
action for which the case arises.116 Professor Gladstone suggests the 
court rely on two factors to indicate if a directed cause of action or a case 
in controversy is directed to the forum state. These two factors are the 
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“selection of language” by which information between two parties is 
communicated and the chosen choice of currency.117 
While this representative sampling of posited solutions has its 
strengths, the weaknesses far outweigh the strengths. Some of the  
solutions are overinclusive, others are underinclusive, while still others  
completely shift away from the notions and policies behind traditional 
personal jurisdiction. Menthe’s suggestion to add cyberspace into the 
international theory of spaces only works for international cyberspace 
controversies; the problem of how to address cyberspace jurisdiction 
within the United States still remains.118 Rollo’s position of adopting the 
cyberspace model is unworkable in that it is not a solution at all. This 
position deprives all courts the authority to adjudicate cases and  
controversies arising from cyberspace activity,119 which leaves an even 
bigger question for how to deal with cybercrimes,120 cyberterrorism,121 
and cybertorts.122 This solution is further unworkable when its creator 
unequivocally notes that its impact would wreak havoc on the questions 
of cyberspace jurisdiction.123 
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The most convincing solution is Professor Gladstone’s, which 
would create a categorical system based on subject matter of the action 
with specific guidance on how to determine proper personal jurisdiction 
in cyberspace for each group-cause of action.124 The weakness of this 
solution is in its practical application. The defining characteristic of  
jurisdiction is the age-old notion of how to bring a lawsuit into a specific 
court, whether it be federal or state, municipal or family, or bankruptcy 
or drug court. 
While there are certain areas of the law that are solely litigated in a 
specific court, such as intellectual property claims and international law 
claims, these are exceptions to the general rule. Usually, jurisdiction is 
primarily viewed as an obstacle for plaintiffs in properly bringing a case 
in a court with appropriate adjudicative authority over the defendant. 
Therefore, the categorical nature of Professor Gladstone’s solution, while 
potentially convincing, is not, on its own, a practical, feasible alternative 
to the current personal jurisdiction regime. 
V. A WORKABLE SOLUTION: WHY THE NINTH CIRCUIT  
GOT IT RIGHT (AND WRONG) 
While the Cybersell opinion articulates a clearer vision of what 
“something more” really means—interactivity and commercialization—
it leaves more to be desired. The court in Cybersell implicitly applied the 
O’Connor plurality test from Asahi Metal by subtly analogizing the 
maintenance of a passive website with the placement of a material good 
by a manufacturer into the stream of commerce and then articulating the 
need for “something more” in order for the court of the forum state to 
properly exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.125  
Specifically, the court held that the mere presence of a passive website 
on the Internet does not constitute the minimum contacts needed to  
subject a nonresident to the jurisdiction of every court and that  
“something more,” either interactivity or purposeful direction, is  
needed.126 While this test preserves the constitutional standards of fair 
play and substantial justice, it is clear that the ruling as it stands remains 
unsatisfactory as courts have continued to struggle with what “something 
more” should be.127 
Interactivity is easier to prove, such as in the case of online contract 
formation, where assent is reached by a user populating specific fields 
with their information and clicking an “I Accept” button. However, with 
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the advent of the Internet, confusion emanated from how to handle  
purposeful availment in cyberspace (i.e., interactive versus passive  
websites). It is necessary to define a contemporary set of actions that are 
sufficient to satisfy the “purposeful availment” prong of the minimum 
contacts requirement for personal jurisdiction. 
While Cybersell brings us one step closer to a viable solution for 
determining when personal jurisdiction is proper for cases in controversy 
that arise in cyberspace—that is, examining interactivity and  
commercialization (the information exchange between the website and 
the user, as well as whether the website has engaged in commerce)—it 
fails to consider a gamut of other claims that could come before the 
court. Thus, the Cybersell court fails to posit a solution that is entirely 
useful. 
One of the most significant categories of claims that the Cybersell 
ruling fails to address are claims that arise in tort. When a claim is  
tortious it is more reasonable for the court to focus on the plaintiff’s 
domicile instead of examining fairness of a forum to the defendant. In 
other words, focusing on decreasing the burdens placed on the injured 
party particularly, if not specifically, when targeted by the intentionally 
or negligently harmful actions of the defendant. While this solution is  
similar to Professor Gladstone’s approach, it is not a categorical  
approach to cyberspace jurisdiction either. Rather, it merely separates 
tortious claims and gives the court specific direction to focus primarily 
on the injured party rather than predominantly considering fairness to the 
defendant. 
The solution, while not initially apparent, becomes clearer after a 
thorough examination and a piecing together of both previously posited 
solutions and past case law. The “something more” that district courts 
have been inconsistently struggling with for years is a melding of the 
Cybersell ruling for non-tortious cyberspace claims with a categorical 
approach for tortious cyberspace claims. This inclusive solution does not 
abandon traditional notions of personal jurisdiction or the restraint of 
hailing nonresidents into a foreign forum, but rather, it fully  
comprehends the need to treat some claims differently than others. When 
a website, or its owner, commits a tort against one of its users it does so 
either intentionally or negligently, and the court should look to make the  
injured party whole again. It should look to where that plaintiff is  
domiciled in determining which court has the proper authority to exercise 
jurisdiction over a tort-committing nonresident in cyberspace. 
Either judicially or legislatively, the Court should adopt or  
Congress should enact a single, clear objective test that combines the 
Cybersell ruling of interactivity and commercialization for non-tortious 
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acts with a focus on the injured party’s domicile for tortious cyberspace 
acts. Put differently, the proposed solution would combine the nexus  
between the exchange of information and commercial activity with a  
limiting, categorical factor for tortious actions. 
In our current system, jurisdiction is viewed mainly from the side of 
the defendant.128 Even if the plaintiff or the forum has a strong interest in 
litigating a case in a particular state—usually the plaintiff’s home  
state—if a court finds that it would be too burdensome on the defendant 
to litigate in that state, the court will either dismiss the case for lack of 
personal jurisdiction without prejudice, or it may remove the case to  
another jurisdiction with proper authority to adjudicate.129 
Because torts, whether negligent or intentional, arise from a  
wrongful act or an infringement of a right of the plaintiff by the  
defendant, in this and only this category, the interest of the plaintiff 
should be deemed more important than the burden on the defendant. In 
other words, the injured party’s interest in obtaining effective and  
convenient relief should far outweigh the burden on the tortious  
defendant. In Tamburo v. Dworkin—an Internet tort case where the  
defendants used their email lists and websites to encourage potential  
customers to boycott the plaintiff’s business and harass him in  
person130—the Seventh Circuit held that the Illinois long-arm statute  
conferred jurisdiction over the defendants because they had  
(1) intentionally directed their communications to Illinois and  
(2) indented harm to the plaintiff in Illinois.131 
In Rusinowski v. Village of Hillside, the plaintiff brought a tort 
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against the defendant 
for using phone calls and Internet contact to direct third parties to  
commit other torts against the plaintiff.132 Similar to the Tamburo court, 
the Rusinowski court held that maintaining jurisdiction over the  
nonresident defendant was proper because the defendant (1) waged a 
campaign of harassment against the plaintiff in Illinois and (2) repeatedly 
contacted local police and the plaintiff’s school in order to upset him and 
potentially have him arrested or expelled.133 In both cases, the court 
found that extending personal jurisdiction to a nonresident defendant, 
when the case in controversy arose out of intentional tortious conduct 
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over the Internet that was specifically targeted toward the plaintiff rather 
than commercialization or interactivity, was proper and did not offend 
the traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice articulated in 
International Shoe.134 Although the court considered the fairness of the 
defendant as required by International Shoe, the court gave primary  
consideration to the injured party’s domicile rather than to the  
convenience of the defendant to litigate in that particular domicile  
because the defendant specifically targeted and intentionally injured the 
plaintiff. 
Certainly this categorical, plaintiff-focused, limiting addition to the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction is not without precedent and should be 
merged with the Ninth Circuit’s Cybersell, Inc. holding to make a new, 
single, clear test for appropriate jurisdiction that is more applicable, more 
complete, more inclusive, and most significantly, more useful. 
CONCLUSION 
While industrialization and mobilization gave rise to the railroad, 
the automobile, the airplane, and the Internet, it also brought new  
challenges of how to apply existing law to a novel phenomenon.135 Some 
commentators suggest the growth of cyberspace changes everything 
about sovereignty, the state, jurisdiction, and law, while other  
commentators suggest the opposite.136 The adoption of the Ninth  
Circuit’s test for jurisdiction set forth in the Cybersell, Inc. decision, 
combined with a single categorical limitation for tortious actions, best 
comports with the traditional notions set forth in Pennoyer and expanded 
upon by International Shoe and World-Wide Volkswagen.137 The solution  
suggested in this Note is not so much a novel invention as it is a carving 
out where the single test is amongst a sea of inconsistency and  
unpredictability at common law. It is not defining new ground, but rather 
restating it and melding it into a test that is actually useful. The existing 
lore is needlessly scattered, but when viewed as a whole and  
retrospectively, each applies a similar standard. The solution posited 
herein is a clearly restated, useable articulation of the spirit and intent of 
that standard. 
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